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Between 1993 and 2000 at least 18 countries saw publication of guidelines that propose 
minimum representation of outside directors on corporate boards.  The apparent premise 
underlying this movement is that boards with significant outside directors will make different 
and, perhaps, better decisions than boards dominated by inside directors.  As the first-mover in 
this movement, the U.K. provides a laboratory for a “natural experiment” to examine this 
presumption empirically.  We investigate one important board task - - the appointment of the 
CEO - - to determine whether boards are more likely to appoint an outside CEO after they have 
increased the representation of outside directors to comply with the exogenously imposed 
standards.  We find that the (coerced) increase in outside directors leads to an increase in the 
likelihood of an outside CEO appointment.  Additionally, announcement period stock returns 
indicate that investors appear to view appointments of outside CEOs as good news.  Apparently, 
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Outside Directors and Corporate Board Decisions 
 
1. Introduction 
Historically, the composition of the boards of directors of publicly-traded U.S. 
corporations has differed from that of most other countries in that U.S. boards have been 
characterized by substantial representation and, in most cases, a majority of outside directors.  
For example, in 1990, for 421 of the Fortune 500 firms (i.e., 84.2% of the firms) outsiders 
comprised at least 50% of the board membership.  In comparison, in 1990, of the largest 25% of 
firms, ranked by market capitalization, listed on the stock exchanges of the U.K., France, Italy, 
Australia, South Africa, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, India, Brazil and Mexico, 
outsiders comprised 50% or more of the board in less than 18% of the firms in each country. 
Over the last decade and beyond, pressure has come to bear on publicly-traded 
corporations worldwide to increase representation of outside directors.  Between 1993 and 
December 2000, at least 18 countries witnessed publication of reports sponsored by their 
governments and/or their major stock exchanges that advocated or mandated minimum standards 
for outside director representation on boards of publicly-traded companies.  These minimum 
standards typically represent a major increase in outside board membership in these countries 
relative to the early 1990s and before. 
Arguably, the recent global movement toward a more prominent role for outside directors 
can be traced to the Cadbury Report issued in 1992 in the U.K.  Among other things, the 
Cadbury Report recommended that publicly-traded U.K. companies have at least three outside 
directors.  Compliance with the Cadbury recommendation represented a sea-change for U.K. 




outsiders comprised a majority of the board for only 21 of the Financial Times (FT) 500 and, of 
all London Stock Exchange (LSE) companies, only 26.7% had at least three outside directors.  In 
comparison, during 1998, outsiders were a majority of the board for 257 of the FT 500 firms, and 
62.3% of all LSE listed companies had at least three outside directors. 
The apparent premise underlying the movement towards greater outside director 
representation is that more outside directors will lead to different and, presumably, better 
decisions by the board.  The purpose of this study is to examine one board task to determine 
whether this premise is justified.  The task upon which we focus is the appointment of the top 
manager.  Our motivation for focusing on the appointment of CEOs derives from the generally 
accepted proposition that one of the key responsibilities of corporate boards is the hiring of top 
managers.  We ask whether the fraction of outside directors on the board is correlated with the 
decision of whether to hire an insider or outsider as the new CEO when the firm’s current CEO is 
replaced.  We use the U.K. as the laboratory for this study because, as we noted, the U.K. can be 
viewed as a first-mover in the global push toward the prescribed inclusion of outside directors.  
Additionally, as we will document further below, prior to the mid-1990’s, in terms of its 
board compositions, the U.K. was the inverse of the U.S., with outside directors being a distinct 
minority in the U.K. and a heavy majority in the U.S.  Most importantly, however, because of its 
status as the first-mover, the U.K. provides a sufficiently long time series of data following its 
recent emphasis on the inclusion of outside board members to allow for a “before-and-after 
event” comparison. 
The prior study most closely related to ours is Borokhovich, Parrino, and Trapani (BPT) 
(1996) who study board composition and CEO appointments in the U.S.  They analyzed 969 




report a positive and significant correlation between the fraction of outside directors and the 
probability of a newly-appointed CEO being from outside the company.  One of the questions we 
address here is whether that result is unique to the U.S.  Additionally, however, we go beyond 
BPT in that their study potentially suffers from endogeneity in the CEO appointment process: In 
particular, it may be that companies that tend to appoint outside CEOs also tend to have a larger 
fraction of outside directors.  Thus, the correlation reported by BPT may be spurious.  Our study 
provides a way around this endogeneity. 
Specifically, our study of CEO appointments in the U.K. spans the eleven years 1989 
through 1999 and, thus, encompasses the period from before to after the publication of the 
Cadbury Report in 1992.  Publication of the Report represents a “natural” experiment in which 
an exogenous force coerced companies into adding outside directors.  If the appointments 
process is endogenous, then, presumably, addition of outside directors in response to this 
exogenous mandate will have no effect on the CEO appointment process.  We do not find that to 
be the case. 
Both before and after U.K. firms comply with the Cadbury Report, the probability of an 
outside CEO appointment increases with the fraction of outside board members.  Additionally, 
however, once a firm comes into compliance with the Cadbury recommendation, the probability 
of an outside CEO appointment increases further.  Thus, at least in part, the appointment decision 
is not endogenous:  Outside directors tend to appoint outside CEOs. 
As we describe later, different countries have taken different prescriptive routes toward 
increasing the role of outside directors.  The U.K. and Thailand have specified a minimum 
number of outsiders.  Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Greece, India, Mexico, and Singapore have 




minimum number and a minimum fraction.  Korea has initially specified a minimum number of 
outside directors with a further provision that provides for a minimum fraction of outside 
directors over a longer term.  We also address the question of whether it is the number or fraction 
of outside directors that affects the CEO appointment decision.  We determine that the fraction of 
outside directors dominates the number, and that, after controlling for other factors in a 
multivariate analysis, the relationship between the fraction of outside directors and the 
company’s propensity to appoint an outside CEO increases as the fraction of outside directors 
increases. 
Of course, these results only indicate that more outsiders on the board lead to different 
decisions (or, at least, different CEO appointment decisions).  The results do not indicate 
whether the CEO appointment decisions are better.  To address that question, at least 
preliminarily, we conduct an event study in which we examine excess stock returns around 
announcements of CEO appointments.  For the companies in our sample, announcements of 
outside CEO appointments are accompanied by an average 2-day excess stock return (0.79%) 
that is significantly greater than the average 2-day excess stock return that accompanies inside 
CEO appointments (0.20%).  Thus, given that the probability of an outside CEO appointment 
increases as the fraction of outside directors increases, the global push toward a more prominent 
role for outside directors is apparently good news for shareholders.  Not only are the board’s 
decisions different, on average, investors apparently expect them to be better. 
 
2. The global movement toward outside directors 
As we noted, in 1992, the Report on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 




traded U.K. companies include at least three outside directors.  Although these recommendations 
have not been legislated, the committee was appointed by the government and the 
recommendations have been adopted by the LSE.  Between publication of the Cadbury Report 
and December 2000, at least 18 other countries witnessed publication of similar reports.  The 
introductory statement in the Handbook for Issuers on The Copenhagen Stock Exchange (2001) 
offers up a justification for this global movement:    
Initially, the Corporate Governance debate arose partly in response to pressure 
from the increasingly prevalent institutional ownership, and partly in response to 
financial scandals at the end of the 1980’s…  The Cadbury Report contained a 
number of specific recommendations regarding good corporate governance also 
called ‘best practice’ or ‘code of conduct’.  The aim was to meet the demands of 
the institutional owners and to prevent new business and financial scandals…  
The debate has more recently moved from primarily being driven by a wish to 
stimulate ‘owner activism’ and increase the supervision of management… (p. 1) 
 
In that spirit, in 1993, the Swedish Shareholders Association established guidelines for 
boards of publicly-traded Swedish corporations that closely mimicked those of the Cadbury 
committee.  In 1994, the King Committee Report on Corporate Governance in South Africa 
recommended that publicly-traded companies have at least 2 outside directors and equal numbers 
of inside and outside directors and, in 1995, the Bosch Committee Report on Corporate Practices 
and Conduct in Australia prescribed that, for listed firms, a majority of the board be outsiders 
and at least one-third be independent. 
In 1998, the Report on Desirable Corporate Governance issued by the Confederation of 
Indian Industry promulgated that for large firms at least 30% of the board comprise outside 
directors unless the chairman of the board is also CEO, in which case the fraction of outsiders 
should be at least 50%; the Report on the Roles, Duties and Responsibilities of the Directors of 
Listed Companies issued by the Stock Exchange of Thailand mandated that boards of exchange-




Belgian Listed Companies adopted by the Brussels Stock Exchanges specified that the board 
consist of a majority of outsiders.   
In 1999, at least six countries witnessed the issuance of mandates and/or guidelines for 
board composition: In Korea, the Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance, backed by 
the Korean Stock Exchange, recommended that financial institutions and large public 
corporations have at least 3 outside directors and gradually increase the ratio of outsiders to 
greater than 50%; in Malaysia, a Report on Corporate Governance issued by the High Level 
Finance Committee and, in France, the Vienot Report on the Boards of Directors of Listed 
Companies in France - - proposed that one-third of the board comprise independent outside 
directors with no fewer than 2 outsiders; in Mexico, the Code of Corporate Governance prepared 
for listed companies recommended that at least 20% of the board be outsiders; and, finally, in 
Greece, the Principles of Corporate Governance issued by the Capital Market Commission and, 
in Brazil, the Code of Best Practice of Corporate Governance issued by the IBGC, 
recommended that outsiders comprise at least 50% of the board. 
 
3. Prior studies  
 As we noted, the prior study most directly related to ours is Borokhovich, Parrino and 
Trapani (BPT) (1996).  They analyzed 969 CEO appointments at 588 large publicly-traded U.S. 
companies over the period 1970 through 1988.  Of these 969 appointments, 187 were outsiders.  
After controlling for corporate performance, firm size, and CEO share ownership, they report a 
significant positive correlation between the fraction of outside directors and the likelihood that a 




outside directors increases the probability that the board will appoint a new CEO from outside 
the company. 
However, as argued by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), board composition (i.e., the split 
between inside and outside directors) and CEO appointments may be endogenous.  If so, it could 
be that firms that are more likely to appoint outside CEOs are also more likely to appoint outside 
directors.  If that is the case, the correlation observed by BPT may be spurious.  If this 
correlation is spurious, i.e., the CEO selection decision is endogenous, changes in board 
composition should have no impact on CEO selection.  Suppose, for example, that firm A 
optimally has few outside directors (say 20% outsiders) and optimally chooses its CEO from an 
internal labor pool, while firm B optimally has many outside directors (say 80% outsiders) and 
optimally chooses an outside CEO.  If the CEO selection process is endogenous, and if an 
external force coerces these firms to reverse their board compositions, and if the boards continue 
to act optimally in selecting their CEOs, firm A will continue to select its CEO internally and 
firm B will continue to select its CEO from an external labor pool. 
 Because the Cadbury Report spurred dramatic changes in the composition of U.K. 
boards, our analysis of U.K. data provides an opportunity to alleviate the problems that may arise 
from the possible endogeneity of board composition and CEO selection.  If the correlation 
observed by BPT is spurious, we should find no shift in the likelihood that outside CEOs are 
appointed in the U.K. following the Cadbury Report.  That is, the CEO selection process should 
be unaffected in firms that are coerced into adding outside directors.  The fraction of outside 
directors might increase, but board decisions will be unchanged. 
Of course, BPT is not the only study to analyze the relation between board structure and 




Kang and Shivdasani (1995) examine factors that influence the decision by Japanese companies 
to appoint an outside CEO.  They examine 174 CEO turnover events over the period 1985 
through 1990.  Of these, 18 represent outside appointments.  The authors report that an outside 
CEO appointment is significantly more likely when the company’s prior performance has been 
poor and when stock ownership is concentrated among several large shareholders.  They also 
report a positive correlation between the presence of one or more outside directors on the board 
and the probability of an outside CEO appointment.  But, with p-values ranging from 0.12 to 
0.19 in various regression specifications, the coefficient of this variable is not significant at 
traditionally acceptable levels.  Of course, the sample is quite small.   
 
4. Sample and data sources 
 We construct an initial sample of 914 companies by selecting every second entry from a 
comprehensive set of companies listed on the LSE as of December 1988.  For each company, 
stock price and accounting data are taken from Datastream for the years 1985 through 1988.  If 
such data are not available, the company is dropped from the sample.  Ninety-nine companies 
were dropped because of insufficient stock price data; 115 were dropped due to insufficient 
accounting data.  The resulting sample contains 700 companies.  For each of these firms, for 
each year 1988 through 1999, we used the Corporate Register and/or annual filings maintained 
at Companies House to identify the top manager.  We identified the top manager as the 
individual holding the title of chief executive officer (CEO) or, if no individual held the title of 
CEO, we identified the executive chairman as the top manager.  Henceforth, we refer to the top 




For each year 1988 through 1999, we also used the Corporate Register and/or annual 
filings to determine the age of the CEO, the size of the board, the number of outside directors, 
the total number of shares held by board members, and the total number of shares held by 
institutions.  A director is considered an outsider if he/she is listed as a “non-executive” director, 
he/she is not related to the company’s controlling family, and he/she was not employed by the 
company historically.  Among other things, this procedure identified all changes (i.e., all 
turnover and, therefore, all appointments) in the top management position for each company. 
We are interested in whether newly-appointed CEOs come from within or outside the 
company.  To make that determination, for each instance in which we identified a 
turnover/appointment in the CEO position, we reviewed the company’s prior-year board roster in 
the Corporate Register and/or the company’s annual filings.  If the new CEO was already a 
member of the board, we consider this to be an inside appointment.  If not, we reviewed articles 
in the Extel Weekly News Summaries, the Financial Times, and Macarthy’s News Information 
Service to confirm that the new CEO was from outside the company.  In this way, we were able 
to identify (and confirm) every new CEO as either an inside or an outside appointment.  For 
certain tests, we repeated this procedure to determine whether the departing CEO had been an 
insider or an outsider at the time of his appointment.   
We are also interested in the circumstances under which the new CEO was hired.  In 
particular, we are interested in whether the previous CEO departed his/her position involuntarily.  
We classify turnover in the CEO position as “forced” by examining articles in the Extel Weekly 
News Summaries, the Financial Times, and Macarthy’s News Information Service.  Turnover is 
labeled forced when: (1) a news article states that the executive was “fired”; (2) an article states 




performance.  In addition, for (2) and (3), the executive must be less than 60 years old and no 
other article can indicate that the executive took a position elsewhere or cite health or death as 
the reason for the executive’s departure. 
In later analyses, we are interested in firm size and performance.  For these analyses, we 
take accounting and stock price data from Datastream.  Our measure of firm size is the book 
value of assets.  We use both accounting earnings and stock returns to measure performance.  To 
measure stock price performance, we use industry- and size-adjusted stock returns (ISARs), 
where ISARs are calculated by subtracting the daily stock returns of an industry- and size-
matched portfolio from the return of the sample company beginning 153 trading days prior to, 
and ending 3 days prior to, the announcement of the CEO appointment.  To construct the 
industry- and size-matched portfolio, for each company in our sample, all other companies with 
the same Financial Times Industry Classification (FTIC) code are ranked from largest to 
smallest according to their equity market values.  The companies are divided into four size 
portfolios.  The differences between the return on the stock in our sample and the equal-weighted 
average return of the appropriate industry- and size-matched portfolio are calculated.  The sum 
of these differences is the ISAR for that company. 
As our measure of accounting performance, we use 3-year average industry-adjusted 
return on assets (IAROA).  For each year, for each company in the sample, we calculate ROA as 
earnings before depreciation, interest and taxes (EBDIT) divided by beginning of the year total 
assets.  Then, for each firm with the same FTIC as the sample firm, we calculate ROA in the 
same way.  Next, for each year, for each FTIC group, we determine the median ROA.  IAROA is 




the three years prior to a CEO appointment.  The average of these three IAROAs is our measure 
of accounting performance. 
 
5. Analysis 
5.1. CEO appointments and board composition:  A first look 
As a first-pass analysis, we examine the relationship between CEO appointments and 
board composition by stratifying the companies in our sample into deciles according to the 
fraction of their boards comprising outside directors.  This stratification of the sample is 
displayed in Table 1.   
The table gives the total number of CEO appointments, the number of outside CEO 
appointments, and the number of outside CEO appointments as a fraction of the total number of 
CEO appointments according to the fraction of the board composed of outside directors.  The 
primary statistic of interest to us is the percentage of outside CEO appointments relative to total 
appointments.  The table clearly demonstrates a positive correlation between the percentage of 
outside CEO appointments and the fraction of outside directors.  The percentage of outside CEO 
appointments increases with the fraction of outside directors, at least up to 70% outside directors.  
In the range of 0.60 to 0.70 outside directors, the percentage of outside CEO appointments 
reaches a maximum of 49.3%.  After 70% outside directors, the percentage of outside CEO 
appointments drops off slightly.  
Additionally, although 40% of the total number of CEO appointments in our sample 
occur in companies for which outside directors comprise less than 0.40 of the board, only 8.0% 
of outside CEO appointments occur in these firms.  Thus, in U.K. companies in which inside 




For comparison, in Table 1, we present similar data for U.S. CEO appointments taken 
from BPT (1996).  (Recall their sample encompasses 588 large public companies for the years 
1970 through 1988.)  For BPT, however, the number of observations for firms with boards 
comprising 0 to 0.40 outside directors is so few that they compress these deciles into a single 
category.  Contrary to the U.K., for the U.S., the bulk of all CEO appointments occur in the 
deciles of companies in which outside directors comprise more than 0.70 of the board 
membership.  That is, most of the companies in the U.S. sample have boards dominated by 
outside directors. 
Like the U.K., in the U.S., appointment of outside CEOs is rare in companies with boards 
composed of fewer than 0.40 outside directors.  Of course, in the U.S., few CEO appointments of 
any kind occur for boards with fewer than 0.40 outside directors because such companies are 
relatively rare.  A further commonality between the two sets of data is the positive relationship 
between the propensity for firms to appoint outside CEOs and the fraction of outside directors - - 
as the fraction of outside directors increases from decile to decile, the fraction of outside CEO 
appointments increases as well, except at the very upper end of the range for U.K. companies.  
As we document later, in a multivariate context, this apparent drop off in the propensity to 
appoint outside CEOs disappears. 
Thus, on the basis of the data so far, the evidence on CEO appointments and board 
composition indicates that results from the U.S. can be generalized to at least one other country.  
As we emphasized above, however, this relationship could be spurious due to an endogenous 




5.2. U.K. board composition and CEO appointments through time 
As a possible way to circumvent the potential endogeneity between board composition 
and CEO appointments, we focus on an interval surrounding the publication of the Cadbury 
Report in December 1992.  Publication of the Cadbury Report presents a natural experiment in 
which an external force pressured U.K. companies into increasing the number of outside 
directors.  DMT (2001) report that board sizes increased, on average, by about 1.5 members 
(from 5.7 to 7.3) and that the fraction of outside directors increased by about 10% (from 35.3% 
to 46.0%) over the four years following the Cadbury Report (1993-1996) in comparison with the 
prior four years (1989-1992).  They further report a significant increase in the rate of CEO 
turnover from before to after publication of the Report, and this increase in CEO turnover is 
concentrated among firms that came into compliance with the recommendations of the Cadbury 
Committee. 
Table 2 reports data on board composition and CEO turnover/appointments by year for 
our sample for the period 1989 through 1999.  As shown in the table, the total number of CEO 
appointments over this period is 523.  On an annual basis, the number of appointments is 
relatively stable through time.  However, because the number of firms in the sample declines 
through time due to mergers, bankruptcies and other delistings, the rate of turnover/appointments 
increases through time, especially after 1992.  Over the four years, 1989 through 1992, the 
average annual rate of CEO turnover/appointments is 7.3%.  Over the next seven years, the 
average annual rate is 10.1%.  Thus, consistent with DMT, the rate of CEO turnover and, 
therefore, the rate of CEO appointments increased significantly after 1992 (p-value for the 
difference = 0.08.)  Similarly, the average board size increased by about 1.5 members after 1992 




In terms of inside vs. outside CEO appointments, the table demonstrates several 
phenomena.  First, in those companies that appoint outside CEOs, the fraction of outside 
directors is significantly higher than in those companies that appoint inside CEOs (i.e., 57% vs. 
46%).  Second, both for companies that appoint outside CEOs and those that appoint inside 
CEOs, the fraction of outside directors increases significantly, and by about the same proportion, 
from before to after 1992.  This result is consistent with CEO appointments and board 
composition being endogenous.  That is, regardless of whether the companies were appointing 
outside or inside CEOs, the fraction of outside directors has increased through time.  For 
example, by 1999, for those companies that appointed inside CEOs in that year, the fraction of 
outside directors (0.50) was about the same as for those firms that appointed outside CEOs prior 
to 1992 (0.51).  Thus, adding outside directors may not alter the CEO appointment decision.  It 
may merely change the board composition. 
Third, however, according to the last column of the table, the number of outside CEO 
appointments as a fraction of all CEO appointments did increase from before to after 1992.  Of 
the total of 189 CEO appointments over the four years 1989 through 1992, 26% were outsiders.  
In comparison, of the 334 CEO appointments over the period 1993 through 1999, 32% were 
outsiders.  The p-value for the difference in percentages of outside CEO appointments from 
before to after 1992 is 0.03.  This result is consistent with an exogenously imposed increase in 
outside directors increasing the likelihood of an outside CEO appointment. 
According to BPT (1996), in the U.S., an outside CEO is significantly more likely to be 
appointed when the prior CEO was “forced” from office than when he/she departed 
“voluntarily.”  To examine whether this effect is present in our data, we replicate the analysis of 




turnover and for all others.  We do not present these results in a table.  Similar to DMT, the rate 
of CEO turnover increased from before to after 1992, and the increase was concentrated in the 
set of companies with forced turnover.  That is, the rate of CEO turnover increased following the 
Cadbury Report and the increase is due to an increase in “forced” CEO turnover.  Additionally, 
in those cases where CEO turnover is forced, the fraction of outside CEO appointments is 
significantly higher than when CEO turnover is voluntary (54% vs. 17%, p-value < 0.01).  In our 
subsequent multivariate analysis, we control for “forced” turnover. 
5.3. Adoption of the Cadbury recommendations, board composition, and CEO 
appointments 
 
 Our analysis of the time series of CEO appointments in Table 2 indicates that the rate of 
outside appointments increased following publication of the Cadbury Report.  If the Report did 
have an impact on CEO appointments, the effect should be most pronounced among those 
companies that adopted the Cadbury Committee’s outside director provision.  That is, the 
company increased the number of its outside directors to at least three.  In panel A of Table 3, we 
present data on the composition of the boards and CEO appointments for these 296 companies.  
That is, of the 700 companies in the initial sample, 296 of them increased the number of outside 
directors to at least three during the period covered by our study. 
 As shown in the table, for these companies, the average board size increased from about 
4.7 members as of 1989 to about 7.9 as of 1999 and the fraction of outside directors increased 
from approximately 0.35 to approximately 0.63.  Also, the annual rate of CEO 
turnover/appointments increased from 7.0% over the four years prior to the Cadbury Report to 
12.9% over the following seven years.  The p-value for this increase is 0.02.  Thus, for the set of 
companies that adopted the Cadbury recommendation, the rate of CEO turnover/appointments 




To determine whether increasing the presence of outside directors increased the 
propensity of boards to appoint outside CEOs, we divide the number of outside CEO 
appointments by the total number of appointments before and after 1992 for these 169 
companies.  For the four years prior to 1992, the percentage of outside CEO appointments was 
24.4%.  For the seven years after 1992, the percentage of outside appointments was 35.4%.  The 
p-value for the increase was 0.02. 
 For comparison, panel B of Table 3 shows the same data for the set of companies that 
were already in compliance with the Cadbury recommendation as of December 1988.  For these 
companies, the board size increased from about 6.2 to about 7.9 from before to after 1992, but 
the fraction of outside directors remained nearly constant at 0.60 throughout the time period.  In 
terms of CEO turnover, this rate is also constant from before to after 1992.  For the years 1989 
through 1992, the annual rate of CEO turnover/appointments was 9.3%; for the years 1993 
through 1999, it was also 9.3%.  Similarly, outside CEO appointments as a percentage of total 
CEO appointments was nearly constant from before to after 1992 for this set of companies.  For 
the years, 1989 through 1992, the rate of outside CEO appointments was 30.0%; for the next 
seven years the rate was 28.6%.  The p-value for this difference is 0.81.  The data in panels A 
and B support the hypothesis that outside directors tend to appoint outside CEOs and that 
increasing the representation of outside directors on the board increases the likelihood of an 
outside CEO appointment. 
 Because the companies in our sample did not all comply with the Cadbury 
recommendation in the same year, we examine CEO appointments according to the year in 
which the company increased the number of outside directors to at least three following 




composition and CEO appointments for the four years prior to the year of adoption and for the 
four years following adoption.  These data are displayed in panel C of Table 3.  In this panel, y is 
the year of adoption. The data in this panel starkly demonstrate the effect of Cadbury adoption 
on board composition.  Over the four years before adoption, on average, outside directors 
comprised about 45.8% of the board; over the four years after adoption and post-1992, on 
average, outside directors comprised approximately 61.9% of the board. 
Of particular interest to us is the increase in the fraction of outside CEO appointments 
that accompanies the increase in outside directors.  As shown in the last column of panel C, over 
the four years prior to Cadbury adoption, outside CEO appointments were 20.0% of all CEO 
appointments.  Over the four years following Cadbury adoption, the fraction of outside CEO 
appointments more than doubled to 40.1% of all CEO appointments (p-value for the difference  
< 0.01.)  This result strongly points to the interpretation that outside board members are more 
likely to appoint outside CEOs, and that an increase in outside directors is likely to affect the 
CEO appointment decision. 
5.4. Multivariate analysis 
Other factors, in addition to board composition, are likely to affect the decision of 
whether to appoint an inside or outside CEO.  For example, the company’s prior performance, 
the company’s size, and the concentration of share ownership might influence the board’s 
decision.  To control for these other factors, we conduct binomial probit regressions on our 
sample of 523 CEO appointments. 
In each of our regressions, the dependent variable is an indicator to identify whether the 
CEO appointment was an outsider (1) or an insider (0).  In the first regression, the independent 




size measured as log of book assets, the number of directors as of the beginning of the year, the 
fraction of directors who are outsiders as of the beginning of the year, the fraction of shares 
owned by the board as of the beginning of the year, the fraction of shares owned by institutions 
as of the beginning of the year, an indicator variable to identify whether the appointment follows 
“forced” turnover (1) or not (0), an indicator variable to identify whether the firm is a financial 
institution (1) or not (0), and an indicator variable to identify whether the incumbent CEO was 
from outside (1) or inside (0) the company. 
We include the company’s prior performance because companies that are performing 
poorly may be more likely to appoint an outside CEO; we include size because large companies 
may have a larger internal labor pool and may, therefore, be more likely to appoint an inside 
CEO; we include board size and share ownership because these factors may directly or indirectly 
influence the CEO appointment decision; we include an indicator for forced turnover because 
our descriptive data indicate that an outside CEO is more likely to be appointed when his/her 
predecessor was forced from office; we include an indicator for financial institutions because a 
cursory examination of the data indicates that financial institutions, as a general rule, have a 
larger fraction of outside directors than firms in other industries, and we include an indicator for 
whether the predecessor to the newly-appointed CEO was himself an insider or outsider at the 
time of his appointment.  We include the fraction of outside directors to determine whether the 
apparent positive correlation between the fraction of outside directors and the likelihood of 
appointing an outside CEO persists after controlling for other factors.  Finally, we include the 
square of the fraction of outside directors because the descriptive data in Table 1 present the 
possibility that the relationship between the probability of an outside CEO appointment and the 




The results of this regression are presented in the first column of Table 4.  According to 
this regression, poorly performing companies are more likely to appoint an outside CEO (p-value 
= 0.08); companies in which the prior CEO was “forced” from office are more likely to appoint 
an outside CEO (p-value < 0.01); and smaller companies are more likely to appoint outside 
CEOs (p-value = 0.02).  The coefficient of the incumbent’s origin is negative, albeit not 
significant at the 0.10 level - - its p-value is 0.17.  This hints that, after controlling for other 
factors, if the existing CEO is from inside the firm, the next CEO is slightly more likely to come 
from outside the firm and vice versa.  None of the other control variables even begin to approach 
significance at any meaningful level (all p-values > 0.28).  In each of our subsequent regressions, 
the p-values of these control variables, along with that of the incumbent’s origin, are essentially 
the same as those in the first regression.  As a result, we will not comment further on these 
variables. 
The variables of particular interest, for our purposes, are the fraction of outside directors 
and the fraction of outside directors squared.  The coefficient of the fraction of outside directors 
is positive and significant (p-value = 0.05).  The coefficient of the square of the fraction of 
outside directors is mildly negative, but does not approach statistical significance (p-value = 
0.59). 
To explore further the possibility of a nonlinear relationship between the likelihood of an 
outside CEO appointment and the fraction of outside directors, we estimate a piecewise linear 
regression with four segments:  0.0 to 0.299, 0.300 to 0.499, 0.500 to 0.799, and 0.800 to 1.000 
for the fraction of outside directors.  The results of this regression are given in the second column 
of Table 4.  According to this regression, after controlling for other factors in a multivariate 




outside CEO appointment is positive and statistically significant over each of the four line 
segments - - the likelihood of an outside CEO appointment increases over the entire range as the 
fraction of outside directors increases.  Because the explanatory power of the regression with the 
piecewise specification for the fraction of outside directors is marginally higher than for the 
regression with the fraction of outside directors squared, we use this specification in subsequent 
analyses. 
The estimated positive correlation between the fraction of outside directors and outside 
CEO appointments is consistent with BPT (1996) and with the proposition that outside directors 
are more likely to appoint outside CEOs.  However, as we discussed above, this result is also 
consistent with a spurious correlation between CEO appointments and the fraction of outside 
directors that derives from an endogenous relationship between the CEO appointment decision 
and board composition. 
Our third regression aims to control for the possible endogeneity between the fraction of 
outside directors and the likelihood of an outside CEO appointment.  This regression includes all 
of the control variables from the second regression.  Additionally, we include an indicator 
variable to identify firms that came into compliance with the Cadbury recommendation 
following December 1992.  That is, we include an indicator variable for the set of companies that 
increased the number of outside directors to at least three over the interval January 1993 through 
1999.  For these companies, if a CEO appointment occurs after compliance with this provision of 
the Cadbury Report, the indicator variable is set equal to 1.  For all other appointments, this 
variable is set to 0. 
For each appointment, we also include the fraction of outside directors.  However, for 




compliance) following 1992, we keep the fraction of outside directors at its pre-adoption level.  
The question we are asking, then, is - - does coming into compliance with the Cadbury Report 
affect the CEO appointment decision after controlling for what the composition of the board 
would have been at its pre-adoption level?  For all other appointments, we use the fraction of the 
board composed of outside directors.  Furthermore, for CEO appointments by companies that 
came into compliance during the period studied, but for which an appointment preceded 
compliance, we use the fraction of outside directors on the board as of the CEO appointment 
date. 
The results of this regression are given in the third column of Table 4.  The coefficients 
for the fractions of outside directors continue to be positive and to have the same levels of 
significance as in the prior regression.  Additionally, the coefficient of the Cadbury adoption 
indicator variable is positive and highly significant (p-value = 0.01).  This result indicates that 
companies that alter their boards to become compliant with the Cadbury Report are significantly 
more likely to appoint an outside CEO than they would have been in the absence of this 
alteration to their boards.  Importantly, this result is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the 
CEO appointment process and board composition are (completely) endogenous.  That is, these 
data indicate that this exogenously induced modification to board composition has altered CEO 
appointment decisions in the U.K. 
One further question that we investigate is whether the movement to three outside 
directors is consequential in itself or whether it is the implied increase in the fraction of outside 
directors that fundamentally affects the CEO appointment decision.  To explore that question we 
estimate the final regression in Table 4.  This regression is the same as the third regression 




appointment regardless of whether the company adopted the Cadbury recommendation.  And, we 
include the indicator variable to identify firms that adopted the recommendation post-1992. 
As shown in the table, the significance levels for the fraction of outside directors are 
similar to those in the second regression, but the significance level of the Cadbury adoption 
indicator variable drops to 0.58.  This regression indicates that it is not the appointment of three 
outside directors that is critical, rather it is the increase in the fraction of outside directors that is 
consequential to the appointment decision.  Or, to put it differently, the appointment of three 
outside directors is likely to have much less effect in a board with 15 members than in a board 
with five members. 
5.5. Accounting performance 
We also estimated each of the regressions in Table 4 with our measure of accounting 
performance, IAROA, (as described in Section 3) in place of stock price performance, ISAR.  
The levels of significance of the coefficients in these regressions are nearly identical to those in 
Table 4. 
5.6. A different type of endogeneity 
Our analysis has considered the possibility that the correlation between the fraction of 
outside directors and the likelihood of an outside CEO appointment is spurious due to an 
endogeneity in CEO appointment decisions and board composition.  But, our results could be 
influenced by a different type of endogeneity.  For example, suppose that a firm is performing 
poorly.  Suppose, then, that a decision is made both to add outside directors and to appoint an 
outside CEO.  In that case, the observed correlation between the addition of outside directors and 
the appointment of an outside CEO is spurious.  It is not due to any cause and effect relation 




decisions to add outside directors and to appoint an outside CEO neither of which were in 
response to Cadbury and both of which would have happened in the absence of Cadbury. 
This type of spurious correlation is unlikely to explain our results.  First, in conducting 
our analysis, we do not consider a CEO appointment to be post-Cadbury adoption unless the 
appointment occurred during the year following the calendar year in which the firm increased the 
number of outside directors to three or more.  Thus, the two events are not concurrent by 
construction.   
Still, however, it may be that the outside CEO appointments tend to occur with a short lag 
following a change in board composition.  If so, outside CEO appointments would be clustered 
immediately after Cadbury adoption.  To evaluate this possibility, we examine the time series of 
outside CEO appointments relative to the year in which a company adopted Cadbury.  For the 57 
outside CEO appointments that occurred in the 4 years immediately after the companies adopted 
Cadbury, 14 occurred during the first calendar year following the year of adoption, 13 occurred 
during the second calendar year after adoption, 15 occurred during the third year, and 15 
occurred during the fourth year.  Over these 4 years, the number of firms in the sample declines 
slightly, but the number of outside CEO appointments remains steady.  Thus, post-adoption 
outside CEO appointments were not clustered shortly after the companies adopted Cadbury.  
Again, these data are not consistent with the concurrent appointment of outside directors and an 
outside CEO, both of which would have occurred in the absence of Cadbury. 
 
6. Stock prices and appointments of CEOs 
 Our analyses of board composition and CEO appointments indicate that the mandating of 




least different CEO appointment decisions.  Whether these decisions will be better is another 
question.  In this section, we present evidence on that question by performing an event study in 
which we examine stock returns around announcements of appointments of CEOs. 
 To conduct our event study, we use the market model procedure with market model 
parameters estimated using daily stock returns over the interval of 153 trading days prior to the 
announcement day through 3 days prior to the announcement day.  We examine excess stock 
returns over the 2-day interval that encompasses the day on which the company issued its press 
release announcing a CEO appointment and the following day. 
We conduct our event study of CEO appointments with the 523 appointments in our 
sample.  Announcement dates are taken from Extel Weekly News Summaries.  As shown in panel 
A of table 5, for the 156 outside CEO appointments, the two-day announcement period average 
excess stock return is 0.794% with a p-value of 0.01.  For the 367 inside CEO appointments, the 
average excess stock return is 0.203% with a p-value of 0.20.  The p-value for the difference 
between the two average excess returns is less than 0.01.  Thus, the stock price reaction to both 
inside and outside CEO appointments is positive, but the reaction to outside appointments is 
significantly greater than the reaction to inside CEO appointments, and the reaction to inside 
appointments is not significantly different from zero.  Thus, to the extent that increasing the 
presence of outside directors increases the likelihood of outside CEO appointments, coerced 
changes in board composition that increase the fraction of outside directors appear to be good 
news for shareholders - - not only do such modifications give rise to different board decisions, 
the stock price data indicate that market participants view the decisions as better. 
As a refinement of this test, we split the outside appointments into those that occurred 




and post-Cadbury adoption (the post-adoption set) and conduct an event study for the two groups 
separately.  We conduct this analysis because our set of outside CEO appointments contains 
some that occurred prior to the Cadbury Report and some that occurred post-1992, but were not 
among companies that had recently complied with the Cadbury Report.  Presumably, the CEO 
appointment decisions by these companies were not altered by the Cadbury recommendation.  
They would have occurred anyway.  It is possible that the significant excess return associated 
with outside appointments is due to those that would have occurred regardless of the Cadbury 
Report.  As shown in Table 5, the average two-day announcement period excess return for the 
pre-adoption set is 0.78%; for the post-adoption set, it is 0.80%.  Thus, the positive excess return 
associated with outside CEO appointment is not confined to those that would have occurred 
regardless of Cadbury - - outside CEO appointments appear to be good news for shareholders. 
 We examine one other factor.  We split the sample according to the origin of the 
departing CEO and the origin of the new CEO.  That is, we split the sample into four sets - - 
those in which the departing CEO and the new CEO were from inside the company (319 
observations); those in which the departing CEO and the new CEO were from outside the 
company (29 observations); those in which the departing CEO was from outside while his 
replacement was from inside (48 observations) and the remainder set (127 observations).  The 
stock price reactions are positive and significant for outside CEO appointments and insignificant 
for inside appointments regardless of the incumbent’s origins. 
 One well-recognized shortcoming of simple event studies such as this one is that they do 
not control for investors’ expectations.  For example, it could be that inside appointments are 
well anticipated, whereas, outside appointments involve greater uncertainty.  In that case, it 




participants, but because inside appointments have been well anticipated, the observed stock 
price reaction to such appointments is muted.  If we could control for market expectations, we 
would expect to see the greatest stock price reaction, either positive or negative, to appointments 
that run counter to expectations.  That is, suppose market participants had been expecting an 
inside CEO appointment, but the company announces an outside appointment.  Then, assuming 
that an outside appointment is good news, we would expect a larger and positive stock price 
reaction relative to the case in which investors had been expecting an outside appointment and an 
outside appointment was announced even though the outside appointment is still good news. 
Now consider the opposite case.  Suppose market participants had been expecting an 
outside appointment, but the firm announces an inside appointment.  Again, assuming that an 
outside appointment is good news, the stock price response should be lower relative to the case 
in which investors had been expecting an inside appointment and an inside appointment was 
announced. 
To calibrate market expectations, we use the final regression from Table 4 to estimate the 
likelihood of an outside CEO appointment for each appointment in our sample.  For the sample 
of outside CEO appointments, we group the 2-day announcement period excess return into three 
mutually exclusive groups according to the probability of an outside CEO appointment implied 
from Table 4: (1) low probability - - 0.00 to 0.33, (2) medium probability - - 0.34 and 0.66; and 
(3) high probability - - 0.67 to 1.00.  The event study results for the corresponding groups of 
CEO appointments are presented in the last column in panel B of Table 5.  Outside CEO 
appointments are associated with statistically significant positive announcement period returns 
and, importantly, as the probability of an outside appointment declines, the announcement period 




positive is the stock price response.  For example, when the probability of an outside 
appointment is 0.67 to 1.00, the announcement period excess return is 0.43% (p-value = 0.05); 
when the probability of an outside appointment is 0.00 to 0.33, the announcement period excess 
return is 1.135% (p-value < 0.01).  As regards inside CEO appointments, in no category is the 
announcement period return significantly different from zero.   
To further explore the relation between market expectations and announcement period 
returns, we regress the 2-day announcement period excess returns against the implied probability 
of an outside CEO appointment from Table 4.  The results of the cross-sectional regressions are 
presented in the last column in panel C of Table 5.  If outside CEO appointments are good news, 
or at least better news than an inside appointment, the coefficient of this cross sectional OLS 
regression should be negative - - as it is, with a p-value of 0.10.  Then, for the sample of inside 
appointments, we perform the same regression the results of which are given in the middle 
column of panel C of Table 5.  Again, if outside appointments are good news or, more 
accurately, if they are less better news than inside appointments, the coefficient for inside CEO 
appointments will be negative - - which it is again, but, in this case, the p-value is only 0.29.  The 
regression results support our interpretation of the event study to mean that investors view 
outside CEO appointments as good news. 
 
7. Commentary and conclusions 
 Over the last decade (and beyond), stock exchanges and governmental bodies have 
pushed publicly-traded companies to increase the number and fraction of outside directors on 
their boards.  Specifically, over the period 1993 through 2000, at least 18 countries have seen 




minimum number of outside directors for public companies and this minimum is substantially 
higher than the historical norm in those countries.  This movement toward an increased role for 
outside directors appears to rest on the twin presumptions that boards with more outside directors 
will make different decisions, and that those decisions will be better, than otherwise would have 
been the case.  Both of these premises are largely untested. 
 In this study, we investigate whether an increase in outside directors is likely to influence 
one, arguably primary, board decision - - the appointment of the company’s CEO.  Our 
investigation of data from the U.K. over a time period that spans the publication of the Cadbury 
Report - - which radically altered U.K. board compositions - - provides a natural experiment to 
examine the effect of a change in board structure on board decisions.  With a sample of 523 CEO 
appointments over the period 1989 through 1999, we find a significant positive correlation 
between the likelihood of an outside CEO appointment and the fraction of outside directors on 
the board.  More importantly, we find that the likelihood of an outside CEO appointment is 
significantly higher among those firms that became compliant with the recommendations of the 
Cadbury Report.  This result indicates that increasing the representation of outside directors on 
the board is likely to influence board decisions, at least as regards the appointment of inside or 
outside CEOs. 
An equally important question is whether the decisions will be better.  We provide 
evidence on that question by conducting an event study surrounding announcements of CEO 
appointments in our sample.  The average two-day stock price reaction to announcements of 
outside CEO appointments is significantly greater than the average two-day stock price reaction 




more likely to appoint outside CEOs, investors appear to perceive that boards with substantial 
outside director representation make better decisions. 
 Our data appear to indicate that the global movement toward greater outside director 
representation will lead to different and, perhaps, better board decisions.  Several caveats are in 
order.  First, our study encompasses only one country.  Whether our results can be generalized 
globally is an open question.  As emphasized by LaPorta, Lopez-de-Salines, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997, 1998) and Stulz and Williamson (2001), among others, corporate governance systems 
appear to differ systematically across countries and cultures.  If so, generalizing results from one 
political or cultural regime to another may be hazardous.  Although our results are buttressed by 
an earlier study from the U.S., the similar common law origins of the U.K. and the U.S. 
corporate governance systems must be considered when applying the results to other countries.  
As other countries gain experience with their own mandates for additional outside directors, their 
data will provide fertile grounds for further study of the questions examined herein. 
 Second, our analysis considers only one specific board task.  Whether our results can be 
generalized to other board decisions is also an open question. 
 Finally, the results of our analysis of whether decisions by boards with more outside 
directors are better (as well as different) are suggestive, but still preliminary.  In future work, we 
hope to extend our analysis of whether outside directors make better decisions to encompass 
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CEO appointments classified according to composition of the board of directors for a sample of 700 U.K. companies over the period 1989 through 1999 
in comparison with CEO appointments for a sample of 969 U.S. companies over the period 1977 through 1988 
 
 












percent of all  












percent of all  
CEO appointments 
   
Turnover and appointments for U.K. companies  Turnover and appointments for U.S. companies 
         
       0 – 0.09 59 1 1.70%      
≥0.10 – 0.19 40 1 2.50      
≥0.20 – 0.29 57 4 7.02      
≥0.30 – 0.39 53 7 13.21         0 – 0.40 35 2 5.71% 
≥0.40 – 0.49 48 18 37.50  ≥0.40 – 0.50 54 7 12.96 
≥0.50 – 0.59 94 46 48.94  ≥0.50 – 0.60 109 16 14.68 
≥0.60 – 0.69 73 36 49.32  ≥0.60 – 0.70 198 35 17.68 
≥0.70 – 0.79 29 13 44.83  ≥0.70 – 0.80 253 49 19.37 
≥0.80 – 0.89 48 20 41.68  ≥0.80 – 0.90 261 61 23.37 
≥0.90 – 1.00 22 10 45.45%  ≥0.90 – 1.00 59 17 28.81% 
         
      Total 523 156         Total 969 187  
         
 
Initial sample of U.K. companies consists of 914 randomly selected industrial and financial companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) as of December 1988.  214 companies were dropped from the initial sample 
due to insufficient stock price and accounting data for the years 1985-1988.  The final sample contains 700 companies.  For each firm, for each year 1988-1999, the Corporate Register and/or annual filings maintained at 
Company’s House were used to identify the CEO and the names of the directors. This procedure identified 523 changes in the CEO (i.e., CEO turnover and appointments) over the years 1989-1999.  A director is considered 
an “outsider” if he/she is listed as a non-executive director, is not related to the company’s controlling family, and was not employed by the company historically.  If the new CEO was a member of the board in the prior year, 
we consider this to be an inside CEO appointment.  All others are outside CEO appointments confirmed by examination of articles in the Extel Weekly News Summaries, the Financial Times, and Macarthy’s News 





Table 2  
Number and rate of inside and outside CEO appointments over the period 1989 through 1999 for a sample of 700 U.K. companies 
 


































as percent of 
all CEO 
appointments  
             
1989 700 49 7.0 5.9 0.35  36 0.32  13 0.43 26.53% 
1990 662 48 7.3 6.6 0.42  36 0.38  12 0.55 25.00 
1991 626 47 7.5 5.6 0.44  34 0.42  13 0.50 27.66 
1992 601 45 7.5 6.0 0.49  34 0.47  11 0.56 24.44 
1993 578 48 8.3 7.3 0.55  34 0.49  14 0.57 29.17 
1994 539 47 8.7 7.2 0.50  32 0.45  15 0.53 31.91 
1995 499 48 9.6 7.6 0.50  34 0.48  14 0.54 29.17 
1996 477 51 10.7 7.6 0.53  36 0.46  15 0.63 29.41 
1997 458 48 10.5 8.0 0.57  32 0.49  16 0.60 33.33 
1998 438 46 10.5 7.4 0.60  30 0.49  16 0.66 34.78 
1999 417 46 11.0 7.7 0.61  29 0.50  17 0.69 39.16% 
             
Total  523     367   156   




The sample contains 700 industrial and financial firms listed on the LSE as of December 1988.  The sample size declines through time due to takeovers, bankruptcies, and other delistings.  For each firm, for each year 1988-
1999, the Corporate Register and/or annual filings maintained at Company’s House were used to gather data on the identity of the CEO, the name of each director, the size of the board, and the number of outside directors.  
This procedure identified 523 CEO changes (i.e., turnover and appointments).  The rate of turnover and appointments is the number of appointments during the year divided by the number of companies in the sample at the 
beginning of the year.  A director is an “outsider” if he/she is listed as a non-executive director, is not related to the company’s controlling family, and was not employed by the company historically.  If the new CEO was a 
member of the board in the prior year, we consider this to be an “inside” CEO appointment.  All others are “outside” CEO appointments confirmed by articles in the Extel Weekly News Summaries, the Financial Times, and 






Number and rate of inside and outside CEO appointments grouped by Cadbury Committee compliance with respect to a minimum of 3 outside directors 
over the period 1989 through 1999 for a sample of 700 U.K. companies  
 
Panel A : CEO appointments for firms that adopted the Cadbury Committee recommendations of at least 3 outside directors anytime over 1989 through 1999 






























as percent of 
all CEO 
appointments 
           
1989 296 19 6.4 4.7 0.35  14 0.28  5 0.52 26.32% 
1990 277 18 6.5 4.7 0.30  14 0.26  4 0.44 22.22 
1991 271 20 7.4 4.9 0.37  15 0.30  5 0.47 25.00 
1992 264 21 8.0 5.0 0.41  16 0.36  5 0.49 23.81 
1993 250 25 10.0 6.3 0.57  17 0.51  8 0.64 32.00 
1994 243 27 11.1 7.0 0.62  17 0.55  10 0.68 39.04 
1995 233 26 11.2 7.5 0.61  17 0.56  9 0.67 34.62 
1996 224 31 13.8 7.8 0.64  20 0.57  11 0.68 35.48 
1997 222 32 14.4 8.2 0.65  20 0.53  12 0.69 37.50 
1998 217 34 15.7 8.0 0.64  22 0.57  12 0.67 35.29 
1999 208 31 14.9 7.9 0.63  20 0.55  11 0.67 35.48% 
             
Total  284     192   92   
(Average)        (0.53)   (0.63)  
 
 
Panel B : CEO appointments for the firms that were always in compliance with the Cadbury Committee recommendations of at least 3 outside directors over 1993 through 1999  
           
1989 203 17 8.4 6.3 0.59  12 0.43  5 0.62 29.41% 
1990 194 18 9.3 6.2 0.64  12 0.47  6 0.60 33.33 
1991 184 19 10.3 6.2 0.56  13 0.51  6 0.70 31.58 
1992 170 16 9.4 6.0 0.59  12 0.51  4 0.62 25.00 




Continued/ Table 3 
 
 
1994 147 14 9.5 7.2 0.56  10 0.54  4 0.66 28.57 
1995 138 14 10.1 7.9 0.65  10 0.54  4 0.62 28.57 
1996 130 13 10.0 7.9 0.55  10 0.59  3 0.65 23.08 
1997 119 9 7.6 7.9 0.61  6 0.55  3 0.67 33.33 
1998 109 9 8.3 7.9 0.63  6 0.55  3 0.67 33.33 
1999 105 9 8.6 7.9 0.61  8 0.53  3 0.66 33.33% 
          
Total  154     111   45   
(Average)        (0.53)   (0.66)  
 
 
Panel C : CEO appointments for firms that adopted the Cadbury Committee recommendations of at least 3 outside directors anytime over 1993 through 1999 centered around the 
year of adoption (y) 
 y-4 235 18 7.7 5.0 0.40  15 0.34  3 0.48 16.67% 
 y-3 239 19 8.0 5.7 0.45  15 0.36  4 0.50 21.05 
 y-2 244 20 8.2 6.1 0.47  16 0.34  4 0.53 20.00 
 y-1 248 23 9.3 6.4 0.48  18 0.40  5 0.55 21.74 
 y             
 y+1 247 39 15.8 7.8 0.61  25 0.56  14 0.69 35.90 
 y+2 242 33 13.6 7.7 0.63  20 0.59  13 0.68 39.39 
 y+3 237 36 15.2 7.8 0.62  21 0.58  15 0.64 41.67 
 y+4 233 34 14.6 8.0 0.60  19 0.55  15 0.65 44.12% 
             
Total  222     149   73   
(Average)        (0.50)   (0.63)  
 
The sample contains 700 industrial and financial firms listed on the LSE as of December 1988.  The sample size declines through time due to takeovers, bankruptcies, and other delistings.  For each firm, for each year 1988-
1999, the Corporate Register and/or annual filings maintained at Company’s House were used to gather data on the identity of the CEO, the names of the directors, the size of the board, and the number of outside directors.  
This procedure identified 523 CEO changes (i.e., turnover and appointments).  The rate of turnover and appointments is the number of appointments during the year divided by the number of companies in the sample at the 
beginning of the year.  A director is an “outsider” if he/she is listed as a non-executive director, is not related to the company’s controlling family, and was not employed by the company historically.  If the new CEO was a 
member of the board in the prior year, we consider this to be an “inside” CEO appointment.  All others are “outside” CEO appointments confirmed by articles in the Extel Weekly News Summaries, the Financial Times, and 
Macarthy’s News Information Service.  Average fraction of outside directors is the average of the number of outside directors divided by total directors for each company as of the beginning of each year.  The 700 firms in the 
sample are separated into 3 sets.  The first set (shown in Panel A) is firms that adopted the Cadbury recommendation of a minimum of 3 outside directors over the period 1989-1999 (i.e., they increased the number of outside 
directors to at least 3).  The second set (shown in Panel B) was always in compliance with the Cadbury recommendation of a minimum number of 3 outside directors in all years 1989-1999.  The third set of firms (not shown 







Probit regressions of outside CEO appointments for a sample of 523 CEO appointments by 700 U.K. firms over the period 1989 through 1999  
 
 Independent Variables  (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv) 
              
 Intercept  0.954 (0.414)  0.809 (0.496)  0.736 (0.535)  0.872 (0.456) 
 Control variables:             
 ISAR (Industry- and size-adjusted stock return)  -0.122 (0.070)  -0.124 (0.066)  -0.122 (0.067)  -0.127 (0.065) 
 Log of book value of assets  -1.021 (0.022)  -1.014 (0.024)  -0.995 (0.024)  -1.035 (0.022) 
 Indicator for forced CEO turnover  0.745 (0.000)  0.743 (0.000)  0.763 (0.000)  0.765 (0.000) 
 Indicator for financial institutions  -0.047 (0.774)  -0.043 (0.797)  -0.071 (0.660)  -0.060 (0.708) 
 Board share ownership  -0.152 (0.600)  -0.167 (0.567)  -0.164 (0.588)  -0.162 (0.584) 
 Institutional share ownership  -0.607 (0.284)  -0.630 (0.266)  -0.581 (0.316)  -0.623 (0.272) 
 Board size  0.019 (0.393)  0.015 (0.497)  0.017 (0.442)  0.012 (0.606) 
 Indicator for origin of incumbent CEO  -0.264 (0.168)  -0.265 (0.167)  -0.279 (0.145)  -0.274 (0.152) 
 Outside director variables:             
 Fraction of outside directors  2.077 (0.046)          
 Fraction of outside directors squared  -0.585 (0.572)          
 ≥ 0.000 to 0.299 outside directors     2.741 (0.062)  2.500 (0.063)  2.690 (0.066) 
 ≥ 0.300 to 0.499 outside directors     2.390 (0.002)  2.334 (0.004)  2.303 (0.004) 
 ≥ 0.500 to 0.799 outside directors     1.881 (0.000)  1.762 (0.000)  1.807 (0.000) 
 ≥ 0.800 to 1.000 outside directors     1.732 (0.000)  1.763 (0.000)  1.659 (0.000) 
 Indicator for Cadbury adoption        0.375 (0.010)  0.078 (0.588) 
              
 Log-likelihood  -266.57  -265.68  -267.22  -265.81 
 Pseudo r2  0.1311  0.1341  0.1290  0.1336 
 
The sample contains 700 industrial and financial firms listed on the LSE as of December 1988.  For each firm, for each year 1988-1999, the Corporate Register and/or annual filings at Company’s House were used to 
gather data on the identity of the CEO, the names of the directors, the size of the board, the number of outside directors the fraction of shares owned by the board and financial institutions, and whether the incumbent CEO 
had come form inside or outside the company.  This procedure identified 523 CEO appointments.  A director is an “outsider” if he/she is listed as a non-executive director, is not related to the company’s controlling 
family, and not employed by the company historically.  If the new CEO was a member of the board in the prior year, we consider this to be an “inside” CEO appointment.  All others are “outside” CEO appointments 
confirmed by articles in the Extel Weekly News Summaries, the Financial Times and Macarthy’s News Information Service.  The fraction of outside directors is the number of outside directors divided by total directors for 
each company as of the beginning of each year.  The dependent variable in the regressions is 1 if an outside CEO is appointed and 0 otherwise. Stock price and book assets are from Datastream.  Industry- and size-
adjusted stock returns (ISAR) are calculated by subtracting the daily stock returns of an industry- and size-matched portfolio from the daily return of the sample firm beginning 253 days prior to and ending 3 days prior to 
the announcement of a CEO appointment.  Indicator for forced turnover is 1 when: (a) a news article states that the CEO was “fired”; (b) an article states that the CEO “resigned”; or (c) an article indicates that the 
company was experiencing poor performance.  In addition, for (b) and (c), the executive must be less than 60 years old.  The Cadbury-adoption indicator is 1 when firms increased the number of outside directors to at 





Stock price response to 523 CEO appointments by 700 U.K. firms over the period 1989 through 1999 
 
Panel A : Stock price response on the announcement of CEO appointments 
 Number Inside CEO Number Outside CEO 
  appointments  appointments  
        
Appointments 367 0.203   (0.20) 156 0.794   (0.01) 
  
Pre-Cadbury CEO appointments 140 0.219   (0.19) 49 0.781   (0.01) 
Post-Cadbury CEO appointments 227 0.187   (0.21) 107 0.803   (0.01) 
 
Departing CEO had been appointed  319 0.210   (0.19) 127 0.818   (0.01) 
 from inside the firm 
Departing CEO had been appointed  48 0.191   (0.20) 29 0.764   (0.02) 
 from outside the firm 
 
 
Panel B : Stock price response on the announcement of CEO appointments classified according to likelihood of a CEO appointment based on the last regression in Table 4 
 
0.00 to 0.33 (Low probability) 49 0.311   (0.12) 50 1.135   (<0.01) 
 
0.34 to 0.66 (Medium probability) 125 0.207   (0.20) 57 0.784   (0.01) 
 
0.67 to 1.00 (High probability) 193 0.097   (0.62) 49 0.430   (0.05) 
 
 
Panel C : Cross-sectional regressions for the 2-day announcement period excess return on the likelihood of a CEO appointment based on the last regression in Table 4 
 
Regression coefficient (p-value) 367 -0.168   (0.29) 156 -0.435   (0.10) 
 
 
The sample contains 700 industrial and financial firms listed on the LSE as of December 1988.  For each firm, for each year 1988-1999, the Corporate Register and/or annual filings at Company’s House were used to gather 
data on the identity of the CEO, the names of the directors, the size of the board, the number of outside directors, the fraction of shares owned by the board and financial institutions, and whether the incumbent CEO was from 
inside or outside the comapny.  This procedure identified 523 CEO appointments.  A director is an “outsider” if he/she is listed as a non-executive director, is not related to the company’s controlling family, and was not 
employed by the company historically.  If the new CEO was a member of the board in the prior year, we consider this to be an “inside” CEO appointment.  All others are “outside” CEO appointments confirmed by articles in 
the Extel Weekly News Summaries, the Financial Times and Macarthy’s News Information Service.  Stock prices are from Datastream.  Event study stock returns are calculated by subtracting the daily stock returns of the 
LSE All Share Index from the daily return of the sample firm 1day prior to and ending on the announcement day of a CEO appointment.  The likelihood of a CEO appointment is estimated from the final regression in Table 4.  
p-value for 2-tailed tests are in parentheses. 
 
